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 Asprox botnet has been around since 2007
 Initially used exclusively for sending phishing emails
 Around May 2008, a new update was pushed to Asprox bots
 an attempt to grow the size of the botnet
 SQL injection vector
 A significant number of web servers have since been 
attacked and their unsuspecting visitor machines turned 
into Asprox bots




 Data Collection & Overview
 Analysis of Asprox Infection Dynamics
 Asprox Bots




Data on SQL-injecting Asprox Bots
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Collection Period 8/9/2008 ~ 8/25/2008 (17 days)
Unique IP addresses of attacking bots 57,419
Autonomous systems attackers belonged to 1,847
Web servers targeted 581
 Information about Asprox bots that attacked web servers 
at Indiana University in August 2008
 SQL-injection attacks
Data on JavaScript-Delivery Hosts
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Collection Period 10/26/2008 ~ 1/31/2009 (98 days)
Unique Hostnames 324
With gTLDs 151 (.com: 105, .name:28, .mobi:11, .net:4, .org:3)












 JavaScript-delivery hosts  DNS servers for JavaScript-
delivery hosts
Data on Infected Web Servers (1/2)
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 Data collection
 Searched web pages containing the URLs pointing to the 
malicious JavaScript delivery hosts
 Used Google and Yahoo search APIs
 Examined web pages in search results, including the cached 
pages
 Web-server classification in the search results
 Infected but unreachable
 Infected, reachable, but undecidable
 Infected, reachable, and identifiable
Data on Infected Web Servers (2/2)
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 Data collection period
 11/01/2008 ~ 01/31/2009 (92 days)
Class # of Servers %
Total # of infected web servers 8,926 100%
Infected but unreachable 2,751 30.82%
Infected, reachable, but undecidable 1,141 12.78%
Infected, reachable, and identifiable 5,034 56.40%
Outline
 Introduction
 Data Collection & Overview
 Analysis of Asprox Infection Dynamics
 Asprox Bots
 JavaScript-Delivery Hosts
 Infected Web Servers
 Concluding Remarks
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Analysis of Asprox Bots
9
 The number of attacking bots is lesser on weekdays than 
weekends
 Artifact of the fact that many bots are residential machines
 New bots are added to the pool as the week progresses, 
with peaks on Saturdays
 Modest number (up to 3,000) of bots are being reused
 More bots are reused on weekend like the trend of the new 
bot addition
Attack Times by Asprox Bots
10
 Asprox bots attacking on a 
weekend day (8/9)
 Asprox bots attacking on a 
weekday (8/20)
Active Lifetime and Repeated Attacks
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 Around 95% of attacking bots were observed for less 
than 2 days
 Helps avoid any IP blacklisting
 Over 50% of web servers were continuously attacked for 
8 days
 90% of the bots attacked the same web server about 10 
times
 In some cases, one attacker hit the same target over 500 times







 Only 27 out of 55 JavaScript delivery hosts were actively 
used during our data collection period
 Among the 27 JavaScript delivery hosts, 58% of them 
appear to be actively fluxing.
 One example, www.berkje.ru
 1,542 IP addresses
 Geographically spread through 60 countries
# of IP addresses and IP diversity for 
www.berkje.ru
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No server name, just IP address 36
Total Number of web servers 5,034
 TLDs of infected web servers
Infected Web Servers
17
 Cleaned web servers  Still infected web servers
 77% of the servers were cleaned and the rest stayed 
infected during our collection period.
Conclusion
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 Asprox botnet continues to grow and infect web servers 
around the world
 Passive monitoring such as Honeypot is not sufficient 
 to understand the attack in its entirety or 
 to detect changes or modifications to the final vulnerabilities 
used to attack users’ machines or the malware payload 
delivered
 Adopting the mitigation for the SQL injection attacks 
would take a long education cycle 
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Questions?
shiny@cs.indiana.edu
